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SUMMARY 
The analytical and statistical services of border management organizations in Central and Eas-
tern European countries have registered and accumulated a vast body of knowledge on the demogra-
phics and mechanisms of illegal migration over the last one-and-a-half decade. This paper attempts to 
tap this resource by summarising the results of a yearly survey among border guards of 17 countries. A 
set of quantitative indicators of illegal migration is developed, presented and interpreted, based on the 
answers of the border services to a series of quantitative and qualitative questions. This empirical ma-
terial is used to evaluate the dynamics and pattern of illegal migration in Central and Eastern Europe 
on the one hand, and to examine the development of border management strategies on the other. The 
impacts of legal and institutional reforms are investigated in light of the temporal and spatial varia-
tions of border apprehension statistics. The interdependence of the two processes is reviewed from the 
point of view of national border management authorities, perhaps the most authoritative source of in-
formation on the issue. The results of the authors’ annual survey indicate that the progressive develop-
ment of migration control mechanisms at national and international levels seems to have a significant 
impact on irregular migration flows as most indicators of illegal migration have significantly decrea-
sed after the turn of the century. At the same time, the geographical distribution of illegal migration 
flows in Central and Eastern European countries has become more complex over the years.  
KEY WORDS: illegal migration, Central and Eastern Europe, human smuggling, border management, 
irregular migration, border apprehensions, border control 
Introduction 
During the 1990s irregular migration to, through and from Central and Eastern 
European countries (CEE) has assumed massive proportions. With the beginning of the 
profound political and economic transformation, the region became a source of numerous 
migrants heading west in search of better opportunities. The opening of frontiers and im-
provements in communication technologies have greatly eased migration, reducing the 
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costs of resettlement. Moreover, as the transition was often accompanied by political in-
stability and weakness of law enforcement mechanisms, many CEE countries additional-
ly attracted flows of illegal migrants in transit from traditional source countries to Wes-
tern Europe.  
When talking about illegal migration we refer to movements of people across na-
tional frontiers in violation of existing regulations. The concept of “human smuggling” 
refers to an illegal migration process in which an agent is involved for payment to help 
a person cross a border illegally, while “trafficking in human beings” involves coercion 
and exploitation of the migrant person. 
On the basis of available data for 2001, the total volume of illegal migration flows 
to Europe was estimated at 650,000 for the EU-15 and at 800,000 for the (now) EU-25 
(Jandl, 2003). Other authors have estimated that each year between 400,000 and 500,000 
migrants are smuggled into Europe (Mavris, 2002). Partly in response to increased migra-
tion pressures from many parts of the world, the Central and Eastern European coun-
tries have intensified international cooperation on migration and have generally drawn 
closer to the European Union.1 The upsurge of illegal migration prompted the develop-
ment of new migration policies in the countries of destination which, supported by the 
strengthening of migration control mechanisms in CEE and increasing international co-
operation in border management, supposedly helped contain irregular flows of people ac-
ross national frontiers. At the same time, facilitators of illegal migration have seemed 
to adjust to changing law enforcement strategies by making use of the considerable or-
ganizational, financial and technical resources available to them.  
This paper offers an overview of the patterns and dynamics of illegal migration in 
Central and Eastern Europe from 2001–2003, addressing the questions of volume, di-
rections and patterns of illegal migration, as well as that of law enforcement strategies. 
While seeking to provide an assessment of the phenomenon of illegal migration in the 
region, we rely on a comprehensive set of data gathered from national border manage-
ment agencies (Futo and Jandl, 2004; Tass and Futo, 2003). We look at the data from a 
comparative perspective, and speculate about the factors that render border management 
more or less successful. After examining data on illegal migration pertinent to 2003, we 
place these findings in the context of a longer time series, which enables us to evaluate 
long-term trends. 
Remarkably, the dynamics of apprehensions of illegal migrants at the border has 
been decreasing over the last three years. Below we discuss whether or not and how indi-
cative this trend really is for the number of illegal border crossings. We also review the 
geographical sources of illegal migration flows, which show progressive decentraliza-
tion: migrants arriving from the top 10 sending countries account for a decreasing share 
in the total number of apprehended persons. While the main direction of flows is still 
from East and Southeast to Western Europe, the pattern of recorded illegal migration 
flows no longer conforms to clear-cut “migration routes”. Several border sections along 
major “migration corridors” record flows in both directions, often by different nationa-
                                                      
1 Foreword by Jonas Widgren in Futo and Jandl (2004).  
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lities. A substantial number of irregular border crossings takes place in the form of return 
migration or the re-admission of migrants who may have previously travelled legally and 
“overstayed” their visas. Moreover, legacies of state disintegration and weak legal and 
institutional frameworks for migration control render certain parts of the region parti-
cularly vulnerable to illegal migration flows.  
Finally, we discuss organisational responses to illegal migration on the part of bor-
der management authorities. We analyse migration policy implementation and border 
controls in a comparative perspective, hoping that this will enable us to single out fac-
tors of success in migration management.  
The role of border management in immigration control 
Irregular migration has been the subject of a growing number of studies in recent 
years. Much of the discussion has focused on factors leading to migration, has reflected 
on migration policies, and analysed the role of networks and of social contexts in migra-
tion. Despite the abundance of both empirical studies and theories, we find that one cru-
cial dimension has not received a degree of attention corresponding to its significance – 
namely the implementation of migration policies at state borders. While in practice po-
licy makers place increasing responsibility on border management authorities in con-
trolling migration, actual border management practices have received so far inadequate 
attention in the literature. Here we seek to overcome this deficiency and offer an alter-
native perspective on illegal migration and migration control – the perspective of the 
national border management bodies themselves.  
 One can distinguish between three distinct yet related clusters of works in mi-
gration literature, focusing respectively on theoretical issues, the policy debate, and the 
implementation level. The first theoretical level is represented by models developed to 
enhance our understandings of migration at large, which are also found useful in the 
analysis of illegal migration. Macroeconomic explanations of migration focus on wage 
differentials between sending and receiving countries that trigger migration flows (e.g. 
Massey et al. 1993), while micro-level approaches stress the importance of individuals’ 
rational calculations of possible costs and benefits associated with decisions to migrate. 
Sociological theories emphasize the role of social networks and social contexts in deci-
sions to migrate – how information flows and how the existence of trust relations within 
ethnic or other groups reduces the transaction costs of migration and smoothes migrants’ 
adaptation in the host society (see, for example, Mehlum, 2002). While this body of work 
helps us understand what factors shape migration dynamics, their scope is usually res-
tricted to theoretical analysis rather than empirical research.  
On the level of policy debate various policy options are designed, weighted and 
examined. What ought to be a set of good migration policies/regulations depends to a 
large extent on the values and traditions of the respective society and the existing legis-
lative norms and practices. As far as immigration is concerned, the discussion would 
usually involve not only economic considerations (“protecting domestic labour markets 
from the inflow of cheap migrant labour”), but would also invoke issues of human rights 
and freedoms (freedom of movement, in particular across national borders) and past 
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experiences (legacies of colonialism or of state socialism, for example). In the Euro-
pean context one rarely finds examples of a pro-active immigration policy; migration po-
licy is usually a mix of restrictions and cautious regulations – known as migration con-
trol.  
Brochmann (Brochmann and Hammar, 1999) mentions that migration controls 
are exercised at different points en route from the country of a migrant’s origin to the des-
tination country. She identifies five major policy junctures, among which are policies at 
origin influencing emigration potential (usually seeking to reduce it), policies control-
ling the flow of migrants at the origin (visa requirements, information campaigns), con-
trol of admission to the territory of the country (such as border checks), control of the 
access to labour markets (issuing work permits), and return migration policies (Broch-
mann and Hammar, 1999: 7–8). Although these authors draw attention to more subtle 
and indirect aspects of migration control, such as preventive measures abroad aimed to re-
duce migration pressure, or (mal)-practices that hinder successful integration and adap-
tation of illegal migrants and push them towards the decision to return, what usually 
matters in the daily practice of migration control are actual border control and return 
policies – mechanisms of direct external control. 
Thus, arriving at the level of policy implementation we find that the main agents 
of illegal migration control are border management bodies, simply because “control” in 
this case is often limited to screening out illegal migrants at the border, identifying and 
combating human smuggling and trafficking networks, and deportation of apprehended 
illegal migrants. Improved border controls reduce the success rate of irregular migration 
and the profitability of smuggling organizations. (Müller-Schneider 2001) 
Illegal migration is bound to exist in places where freedom of movement is res-
tricted by law, and the countries of Central and Eastern Europe are no exception. What ma-
kes the case of CEE even more interesting and challenging, however, is the recent his-
tory of migration in the region and the possibility to trace how it emerged after the 
opening of the borders and changed over the years. In a way, CEE countries have al-
ways been a buffer zone between Western Europe and the East, bridging different civi-
lizations economically, institutionally, and culturally. Yet, until 1990 the region was se-
parated from the West and migration was limited to intra-block movements of people. The 
opening of the borders in late 1980s – early 1990s together with general improvements 
of communication technologies brought about a massive increase of migration in the 
region. Migration of Central Europeans to the West increased manifold, as well as transit 
migration and immigration to CEE from traditional migration countries further East 
and South. Given that Western European counties had already introduced sophisticated 
migration restrictions, much of the newfound migration was destined to be illegal. 
The challenge of illegal migration spurred the development of a migration policy 
debate both on the national and international level. Migration policy takes into account 
such diverse considerations as national security, the state of the national economy (labour 
markets, public budgets), demographic factors (age structure, fertility rates), as well as 
concerns of social and cultural cohesion (Brochmann and Hammar, 1999: 298). Inter-
national factors also influence the making of domestic migration policy, which is parti-
cularly true of the EU and her prospective members.  
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Trying to identify the factors of success in migration management, Brochmann 
singles out the history of handling migration flows as possibly having a positive effect 
on the ability of the state to regulate migration (Brochmann and Hammar, 1999: 3).2 In-
deed, a long tradition of managing immigration presupposes the existence of organiza-
tional structures and procedures that can be expected to facilitate migration manage-
ment tasks. Another factor possibly conducive to efficient migration management is the 
existence of developed legislative regulations. Yet, it may present both an asset and a 
barrier from the point of view of the authorities’ ability to handle immigration. On the one 
hand, well-established legal regulations may be easily activated once the need arises; 
on the other hand, they may be difficult to change when new circumstances call for it.  
Brochmann and Hammar also point at the adoption of a comprehensive ap-
proach to migration management where traditional border control is complemented by 
long-term preventive measures in origin countries, such as development aid (1999: 305). 
As for controlling illegal migration, they stress the importance of internal control me-
chanisms. Internal migration control, along with external control, plays an important role 
in screening out immigrants who managed to enter the territory of a country or, having 
entered legally, overstayed. Among the mechanisms of internal control are controlling 
access to various facilities, such as ID cards, housing and social benefits, which make 
illegal stay more difficult, as well as sanctions for hiring undocumented migrants (“em-
ployer sanctions”). Brochmann goes as far as to claim that the efficiency of immigra-
tion policy is a question of the ability to supervise the labour market rather than of poli-
cing national borders. By and large it depends on the capacity of the state to prevent 
employers from hiring undocumented workers (1999: 323).  
While much of the above-mentioned control mechanisms might be relevant in 
the Western European context, one should be cautious when generalizing these findings. 
Speaking of Central and Eastern Europe it is easy to observe that countries of the re-
gion lack experience of migration regulation due to many years of having had a closed 
system. Yet, these countries were quick and flexible in adopting restrictive migration 
regulations originally developed by more experienced receiving countries. As for ac-
tive migration policies in the countries of migrants’ origin this hardly applies to CEE 
countries for the time being. We believe that this lack of active migration policies is re-
lated to the absence of migration management experiences in CEE and to the fact that 
migration management systems are still in the making.  
As for control of illegal migration, the distinction of internal methods of migration 
management (e.g. labour market control) and external (e.g. border control) mechanisms 
is also important in the case of CEE. While understanding that illegal migration may 
only be contained by eliminating its structural preconditions, such as the demand for il-
legal labour, we also have to acknowledge that this process has a long way to go in CEE. 
Institutionalisation of labour market control mechanisms is a long process which, al-
though currently underway, will only bear fruits in the medium-term future. For the time 
                                                      
2 Speaking of Central and Eastern Europe it is easy to observe that the countries of the region lack experien-
ce in migration regulation due to years of having had closed systems.  
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being, border control remains the main mechanism of immigration management in the 
region. 
Apprehension statistics in the years 2001 to 2003 
In 2003 altogether 160 thousand apprehensions, due to migration-related offences, 
were recorded at the borders of the responding 17 countries of Central and Eastern Eu-
rope. Thus, in 2003 the volume of border apprehensions has decreased by almost 20%, 
when compared to the respective data of the previous year. This is the second consecu-
tive year that such a significant decrease can be observed. 
Geographical patterns of illegal migration. The geographical distribution of il-
legal migration flows in Central and Eastern European countries has become more com-
plex over the years. Illegal migrants and their facilitators constantly develop new routes 
and ways in response to changes in laws, visa regulations and stricter enforcement mea-
sures. As a result, “classical” routes of illegal migration have become more blurred and 
migrants often take wide detours in order to reach their final destinations. While the 
main direction of flows is still from East and Southeast to Western Europe, the pattern 
of recorded illegal migration flows does not conform any longer to clear-cut “migration 
routes”. Several border sections along major “migration corridors” record flows in both 
directions, often by different nationalities. A substantial number of irregular border cros-
sings takes place in the form of return migration or the re-admission of migrants who 
may have previously travelled legally and “overstayed” their visas. 
Illegal migration flows are subject to constant change as illegal migrants and their 
facilitators show great flexibility in reacting to changed circumstances (in migration 
and asylum laws, visa policies and enforcement measures). A few examples serve to il-
lustrate this point: 
– Since Bosnia and Herzegovina has introduced a stricter entry regime for Tur-
kish citizens through the airport in Sarajevo, an increasing number of Turkish citizens, 
mainly of Kurdish nationality, have used other routes to Western European countries. 
– In Serbia, the application of a stricter visa regime for Chinese citizens together 
with the discontinuance of direct flights Belgrade-Peking have quickly led illegal Chinese 
migrants to use alternative routes to enter Europe. 
– The lack of a visa policy in the UN-administered Kosovo region has prompted 
a significant number of illegal migrants to enter Europe directly via Priština airport 
(Kosovo). 
– In Cyprus, the lifting of travel restrictions across the cease-fire line, together 
with the approaching accession of the southern part of the island to the EU, have resulted 
in a five-fold increase of border apprehensions in 2003. 
Year-to-year change of apprehension numbers by countries. In the year 2003 
most of the responding Central and Eastern European border services have registered a 
decreasing number of illegal migrants, as compared with the previous year. In some ca-
ses this is the combined result of improved border management and in others it is to be 
attributed to more liberal visa regimes, as was the case for Romanian travellers since 2002. 
However, some countries have reported an increase in apprehensions, such as Cyprus, 
Bosnia and Herzegovina, Armenia and Poland. 
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Table 1: Number of border violation related apprehensions* by place of apprehension, 
2001, 2002, 2003 





Armenia n.a. 15 765 18 990 n.a. 20 
Azerbaijan 7 640 8 299 3 846 9 -54 
Bosnia and Herzegovina n.a. 390 957 n.a. 145 
Bulgaria 5 962 6 451 5 133 8 -20 
Croatia 17 416 5 861 4 214 -66 -28 
Cyprus 182 725 3 726 298 414 
Czech Republic 23 834 14 741 13 206 -38 -10 
Hungary 16 637 15 976 13 533 -4 -15 
Latvia 7 838 9 737 8 566 24 -12 
Lithuania 1 355 797 803 -41 1 
Poland 5 219 4 269 5 063 -18 19 
Romania 31 992 3 084 2 133 -90 -31 
Serbia and Montenegro 1 278 823 855 -36 4 
Slovakia 15 548 15 235 12 493 -2 -18 
Slovenia 20 883 6 896 5 018 -67 -27 
Turkey 92 364 82 825 56 219 -10 -32 
Ukraine 12 558 9 600 9 602 -24 0 
Total 260 706 201 474 164 357 -23 -18 
*Based on reports of 17 Central and Eastern European responding countries in 2003 and on the re-
ports of 18 responding countries to the 2002 survey. Apprehended own nationals included. 
Countries with a high level of apprehensions. In 2003 the scale of illegal migrant 
activity as reflected by the number of apprehensions was comparatively high in the fol-
lowing countries: Turkey (more than 50,000 apprehensions), Armenia (more than 18,000 
apprehensions), Hungary (more than 13,000 apprehensions), Czech Republic (more than 
13,000 apprehensions), Slovakia (more than 12,000 apprehensions) and the Ukraine (more 
than 9,000 apprehensions). These countries are either near to the countries of origin, or 
near to the destination of the migrants.  
Source countries of illegal migration. In 2003, the main regions of origin of il-
legal migrants were as follows. 
– Former Soviet Union. In 2003, the single largest group of illegal migrants who 
were apprehended in the 17 responding countries originated from the territories of the 
former Soviet Union. In particular, the number of illegal migrants of Russian citizenship 
has increased by three-quarters. A substantial share of migrants arriving from Russia is 
of Chechen origin, as a reaction to the armed conflict and the subsequent unresolved 
problems of that region.  
– Rest of Asia. The second largest group of illegal migrants arrived from countries 
of the Middle East, Central Asia, China and the Indian Subcontinent. It is to be noted 
that migration from these regions can be attributed only to a decreasing extent to armed 
conflicts. In particular, the number of migrants from countries that have been stricken in 
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recent years by armed conflicts – including civil wars – is still high, but it has decreased 
by a large margin (Iraq, Afghanistan, Śri Lanka). 
– Rest of Central and Eastern Europe. A third, comparatively smaller group of 
illegal migrants has its origins in the former Socialist countries of Central and Eastern 
Europe. While formerly large numbers of Romanian citizens and citizens of Post-Yugo-
slav countries have been apprehended, in the year 2002 and 2003 this was observed to 
a much lesser extent.  
Table 2: Illegal migration in Central and Eastern Europe. The most important 20 countries 
of origin in 2003*. Number of apprehensions related to border violation by country of 
origin, 2002 and 2003 
Country of origin of 
apprehended persons 
Apprehensions in the 17 
responding countries, 2002 
Apprehensions in the 17 
responding countries, 2003 
Change 2002 to 
2003, % 
Georgia 20 553 21 324 4 
Moldavia 14 308 12 646 -12 
Russia 6 949 11 976 72 
Turkey 10 207 8 524 -16 
Ukraine 8 306 7 514 -10 
Pakistan 4 958 7 172 45 
Iraq 27 729 5 607 -80 
China 6 229 5 273 -15 
Afghanistan 11 890 4 527 -62 
Poland 4 368 3 930 -10 
Bulgaria 6 776 3 729 -45 
Romania 3 472 3 590 3 
Latvia 6 126 3 514 -43 
India 4 713 3 185 -32 
Serbia and Montenegro 2 714 2 825 4 
Belarus 646 2 678 315 
Czech Republic 2 683 2 645 -1 
Bangladesh 1 862 2 562 38 
Azerbaijan 2 520 2 500 -1 
Somalia 668 1 905 185 
* Based on reports of 17 Central and Eastern European responding countries. Apprehended own nationals 
included. The numbers in the above table have been computed the following way. The responding 17 
countries have submitted a “Top ten nationalities and citizenships apprehended” table. For each sending 
country the figures in these tables were collected and summarised. 
Short distance illegal migration. It is to be noted, that a substantial part of migrants 
appearing in the above table has been apprehended while crossing the border to a neigh-
bouring country. The significance of short distance migration is characterised also by 
the following observations: 
– Most of the apprehended people of Georgian citizenship were reported by neigh-
bouring Armenia,  
– and most of the apprehended citizens of Serbia-Montenegro were reported from 
successor countries of the former Yugoslavia. 
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The decentralisation tendency among the sources of illegal migration has continued 
during 2003. For measuring decentralisation, an indicator has been developed: the share 
of the top five sending countries among all apprehended migrants presented by the res-
ponding countries in their “Top 10 countries of origin of apprehended migrants” tables. 
– While in the 2001 survey the first 5 sending countries accounted for almost 60% 
of such apprehensions (Iraq, Romania, Afghanistan, Moldova, Russia); 
– in 2002 the first 5 sending countries accounted for 52% of apprehensions (Iraq, 
Georgia, Moldova, Afghanistan, Turkey); 
– and in 2003 the share of the first 5 sending countries has further declined to 49% 
of all apprehended illegal migrants featured in the “Top 10 countries of origin” tables 
(Georgia, Moldova, Russia, Turkey, Ukraine). 
Long-term trends. Long-term variations of indicators of illegal migration are of 
great interest. However, only a few Central and Eastern European countries are able to 
provide longer consistent time series on border apprehension statistics.  
Table 3: Number of migration related border apprehensions including foreigners and 
citizens of the reporting country 
 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 
Cyprus 122 229 60 52 231 224 182 725 3 726 
Czech Republic 19 172 23 705 29 339 44 672 32 325 32 720 23 834 14 741 13 206 
Hungary 16 446 13 912 15 764 22 906 19 213 19 717 16 637 15 976 13 533 
Turkey 11 362 18 804 28 439 29 426 47 529 94 514 92 364 82 825 56 219 
The observed long-term trends are as follows: 
– In Turkey the number of apprehended illegal migrants has grown from a rela-
tively low level to reach the peak of almost 100,000 persons in 2000. In 2003, Turkey’s 
apprehension numbers still surpass all other countries of the region. This is a clear indi-
cator of the fact that Turkey is not only an important country of origin of illegal migrants, 
but also an unavoidable transit country for many migrants travelling from Asia to Eu-
rope, and a target country itself. Since 2000, the number of apprehensions has decreased, 
which is partly attributable to the fact that the Iraq conflict gave rise to a much smaller 
wave of migration than the longer conflict in Afghanistan. 
– Both Hungary and the Czech Republic share an immediate border with the target 
countries of many migrants. In these two countries illegal migration has shown a growing 
tendency until 1998, and a decrease afterwards. Among other things, this is to be attribu-
ted to the stabilization of the Post-Soviet and Post-Yugoslav states, and to improvements 
and refinements of migration policy measures. 
– For many years the Mediterranean island of Cyprus has been avoided – in fact, by-
passed – by the bulk of illegal migrants. However, in 2002 and 2003 within the time span 
of just a few months, more illegal migrants have arrived from poor countries (such as 
Bangladesh), than in the 5 previous years taken together. Migration policy should be pre-
pared for such unexpected developments. 
Demographic characteristics of illegal migrants. The reports of border manage-
ment organisations show that most illegal migrants are still single male individuals in 
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their best working years (from 20 up to 40–45 years of age). Cases of complete families 
with young children are observed less frequent than five years ago. In 2003 approxi-
mately one-fifth of the apprehended illegal migrants was female, and one in 12 appre-
hended persons was a minor. These proportions have increased since the previous years. 
However, the share of women as an indicator of the family pattern of migration has to be 
interpreted cautiously. Female illegal migrants arriving from the source countries of Cen-
tral and Eastern Europe are increasingly travelling alone, in search of a job. On the other 
hand, most female migrants arriving from Asian countries travel with their families. 
Table 4: Demographic characteristics of illegal migrants according to the apprehension 
statistics of 7 responding countries. Proportions in % 
Share of women Share of minors 
Countries 
2002 2003 2002 2003 
Azerbaijan 15.00 15.00 n.a. n.a. 
Bosnia and Herzegovina 1.03 2.61 3.59 2.30 
Bulgaria 29.53 23.14 5.46 4.79 
Cyprus 5.66 3.68 5.24 5.26 
Czech Republic 22.47 27.19 7.13 15.21 
Hungary 14.29 24.50 n.a. n.a. 
Ukraine 17.39 17.05 2.32 3.07 
Total 18.62 20.69 5.26 8.06 
The changing strategies of smugglers in humans 
Today already the majority of illegal migrants resort to the help of organised human 
smugglers. For example, the Hungarian border guard noted that, while in the middle of the 
1990s only about 20 to 25% of the illegal migrants were assisted in illegal border crossings 
by human smugglers, by now this proportion exceeds 70%. In response to changed cir-
cumstances such as new migration regulations and changes in the visa regime as well as in 
reaction to more efficient border control measures taken by many states, human smugglers 
constantly change routes and their modus operandi. It has been observed that human 
smugglers, after the detainment of only a few groups, change methods and routes, or 
even countries. As it is increasingly difficult to invent new ways of human smuggling, 
older smuggling methods are innovated and reappear in changed forms. 
Modes of border crossing. In general, illegal migrants and their facilitators use a 
wide variety of ways for illegally crossing state borders. In 2003, several countries have 
recorded a noticeable increase in the use of official road border posts for illegal crossings. 
This has been the case in Azerbaijan, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Hungary and 
Poland, even in cases where overall apprehension figures have fallen. In these cases, more 
individuals and groups attempted to avoid border controls by concealing or hiding them-
selves in vehicles travelling in legal cross-border traffic, or by using falsified docu-
ments or documents of another person. This tendency may be due to stricter surveillance 
measures on green borders and is linked to the increasing use of false or falsified travel 
documents. Although illegal migrants use all possible ways of transport, in some coun-
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tries (e.g. in Croatia) the dominant way of illegal border violation is still the crossing of 
the green border on foot. 
Forged travel documents. Several countries in our survey have reported a signi-
ficant increase in the use of false or falsified documents for illegal border crossings (for 
example, Hungary noted a 42% increase compared to 2002, other countries noting this 
trend were Latvia, Poland and Romania). Smuggling organisations often supply illegal 
migrants with passports of countries whose citizens do not need a visa to enter Western 
Europe or with false or falsified Schengen visas. The most general way to forge docu-
ments is to replace the picture in a passport or to replace a few pages. False stamps of 
border crossings are also used in order to deceive border guards. 
Increasing abuse of the asylum system. Several responding services, especially new 
EU-Member States like Hungary, Poland, Slovakia and Slovenia, have reported an in-
creasing abuse of their asylum systems. According to their information, smugglers in-
creasingly advise smuggled persons on submitting applications for refugee status in 
case of apprehension. Often, smugglers bring the smuggled persons to points near to asy-
lum centres, where they can submit asylum applications. After staying at asylum centres 
for a few days, illegal migrants again get in contact with members of smuggling networks 
who assist them in moving on. Thus, detention centres have become a part of the mi-
grants’ routes, and they are being counted on when planning trips. These are places where 
migrants can stay for a while, get food, medical assistance and rest, before continuing 
their journey.  
Organisation of long distance smuggling. As a rule, smuggling organisations 
have an international structure and have trans-border ties with each other. There are in-
stances of migrant smuggling being organised by persons whose activity is based on 
family or friendship ties, or in the framework of loose groups organised to conduct a single 
smuggling operation, but more often smuggling groups cooperate in network-like struc-
tures or, in some cases, even in hierarchical structures. As individual smuggling groups 
and networks have grown over time, using the high profits generated through their ope-
rations, these organisations have progressively specialized and have further improved 
their international ties. 
The division of work of smuggling organisations can be characterised as follows: 
– Recruiters of smuggling groups work in regions stricken by political or economic 
crises. Recruiters in source and transit countries are often disguised as travel agencies. 
– Organisers develop migration channels, by creating contacts and working out 
new methods of transport.  
– Consigners create links between recruiters and the organisers. These people usual-
ly do not take part in any concrete action, but control and guarantee the movement of 
money.  
– Transporters – often taxi drivers – are also important members of the circle of 
perpetrators; with their own, or with rented vehicles, they assure that the border area is 
approached, or quickly evacuated.  
– Guides effectively lead the migrants through the border. They need local exper-
tise and are often recruited from the local population. 
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– Falsifiers of passports and residence permits are often in touch with several 
criminal groups. 
– Hosts and hiders offer accommodation, hiding places and telephone services for 
arriving migrants. 
– Guards and watchers help in fleeing, transporting, resting, and supervising the mi-
grants at resting-places.  
– Bribed officers among border guards or in police organisations provide informat-
ion on weak points in border zones and regimes. 
Within this division of tasks, the operation of human smuggling is usually per-
formed through the co-operation of individual autonomous groups in loose and flexible 
networks. Thus, the organisational structure characteristically resembles an octopus, ra-
ther than a pyramid scheme. 
The main organisers of large-scale smuggling operations, usually do not live in 
transit countries but direct and co-ordinate smugglers operating regionally and locally from 
either the country of departure or from the target country. In a large smuggling network, 
international organisers co-ordinate the activities of national and/or regional organisers, 
who in turn co-ordinate the activities of stage organisers, who oversee drivers, guides, 
persons providing means of transport, accommodation, food, etc. Their relationships 
are usually based on a loose network of ties between group members or separate groups 
who also co-operate with other groups. Only the lowest level of facilitators and guides 
operate at or near the borders. Investigations have shown that the leading organisers of 
smuggling operations (on national or regional levels) are often foreign citizens who live 
in the country permanently or with long-term visas for business-, study- or family re-
union purposes. It should be noted that this tendency has been detected independently 
in several responding states (Azerbaijan, the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Romania, 
Slovenia and Ukraine). On the other hand, the medium or lower levels of smuggling ope-
rations are often made up of nationals of the country of residence or of other co-ethnics 
of the smuggled migrants. Therefore, large smuggling networks are usually made up of 
various different nationalities of smugglers, especially at the lower levels, and they are 
also equipped to smuggle migrants of various nationalities. In contrast, strict conspiring 
activities between the organisers and the smuggled persons based on ethnic ties are in-
variably characteristic of Chinese and Asian illegal migration and, to a certain extent, 
also of Albanian and Serbian smuggling rings. 
Payment techniques and smuggling fees. In case of long distance smuggling the 
payment for carrying out illegal border crossings is separated from the action itself. 
This means that illegal migrants do not directly pay the transporter or the guide, but the 
payment is either pre-arranged in the country of origin (and paid out in instalments after 
each successful step of the journey) or the person who receives the migrants in the final 
country pays the organisers of illegal crossings, based on kinship ties or on the subse-
quent work of the smuggled person in the target country. Payments are usually executed 
via the Western Union system or via money couriers. Some smuggling organisations em-
ploy certain members exclusively to transfer money or to hand over the “wages” of the 
perpetrators working at lower levels of the hierarchy, such as transporters and recruiters.  
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Border management services have registered a wide range of fees charged for smug-
gling services. The amount depends on the smuggled migrant’s country of origin and 
destination, the length of the route (full route or only partial route), the type of smuggling 
services (border crossing modes, document provision, etc.), the risks involved, and is also 
linked to smuggling-related expenses. Typical smuggling fees from a country of origin 
to a Schengen country are: 
– From China to Europe from 10,000 to 15,000 USD 
– From Pakistan and India up to 8,000 Euro, 
– From Afghanistan between 4,000–6,000 USD, 
– From Iran between 3,000–5,000 USD,  
– From the Ukraine, depending on the way of transfer, between 5,000–10,000 Euro, 
– For Tunisians from Turkey to the EU between 2,000–4,000 Euro, 
– From Moldavia to a West European country between 2,000–3,000 Euro, 
– From Serbia and Montenegro through Slovenia up to 3,000 Euro. 
Technical facilities of smugglers. As a rule, smuggling organisations are well or-
ganised and technically well equipped groups, whose activities are veiled with increasing 
secrecy and whose methods of smuggling are constantly adapted to changing circum-
stances and stepped-up enforcement measures. Smugglers make extensive use of modern 
communication equipment. Communication is maintained among others through cellular 
phones purchased especially for this purpose. The whole process of transport from the 
rear regions to the border, the harbouring and transfer of migrants from one smuggler 
to another, is co-ordinated in cell phone conversations. After the operation SIM cards 
are exchanged. Increasing use is also made of the Internet as a means of communication. 
For transport, smugglers often use rented cars or taxis, vans, minibuses, trucks, cargo 
space, containers or refrigerator semi trailers, motorboats and other means of transport. 
Along the borders, smugglers extensively use night vision gadgets, surveillance gad-
gets, and radiophones. The forgers continuously update their equipment for forging pass-
ports and visas and other documents of different countries. Modern computer technology 
is used to improve the quality of document falsifications. 
Organisation of small-scale human smuggling. Many smuggling organisations or 
individual persons serve illegal migrants from geographically closer countries. These orga-
nisations are much less complex and make smaller profits, than organisations speciali-
sed in long distance smuggling. Occasional guidance or transport services offered for a 
simple illegal border crossing are often performed by a single person acting on his own 
or relying on the help of a few others. Small-scale smuggling often takes the following 
forms: 
– Following the mobile phone call of the contact person, a taxi driver transfers the 
migrant over the border. 
– Persons approaching individual migrants at railway and bus stations offer paid 
services for illegally crossing the state border. 
Small-scale smuggling is usually a pre-paid service. Short border crossings on foot 
can cost as little as €30–€40 for a crossing from the Czech Republic to Germany or €50–
€100 for transportation by passenger car from Budapest to the other side of the Aus-
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trian border. Such relatively simple ways of smuggling are typically perpetrated in the 
border regions of former Yugoslavia. Frequently the smugglers are ethnic Albanians of va-
rious citizenships, serving the needs of various illegal migrants of Central and Eastern 
European origin. 
Increasing risk for smugglers. A significant observation emerging from this year’s 
survey of illegal migration is that, while the overall number of border apprehensions has 
declined in most responding countries, the number of human smugglers caught has re-
mained high or has even increased. There are two basic explanations for this:  
– First, enhanced enforcement measures and a greater efficiency of border guards 
and police authorities have led to higher success rates in the detection and apprehension 
of human smugglers.  
– Second, a greater proportion of the illegal migrants transiting through the area 
use the services of facilitators.  
Public policies against organised smuggling in humans and their 
enforcement 
Changes in the legislation. In Central and Eastern Europe the legal basis of migra-
tion policy currently is undergoing significant reform. While the legal conditions for suc-
cessfully fighting human smuggling and trafficking have improved, on the other hand im-
portant steps have been taken to safeguard the human rights of migrants.  
In 2002 and 2003, laws, law amendments and decrees have been adopted in the 
following areas. 
– The legal status of aliens has been newly regulated in Armenia, Croatia, the Czech 
Republic, Hungary, Poland and Romania,  
– Laws on Immigration have been adopted or amended in Armenia and Latvia. 
– Laws and decrees on asylum have been passed in Croatia, Hungary, Latvia, Po-
land, and Romania. 
– Important readmission agreements have been signed with neighbouring countries 
and with countries of origin of illegal migrants in Croatia, the Czech Republic and Li-
thuania. 
– Laws and decrees on human trafficking were accepted in Armenia, Bulgaria, 
Cyprus and Turkey. 
– Laws on the State Border and on its protection have been passed and programs 
of border management were adopted in the Czech Republic, Latvia, Romania and the 
Ukraine. 
– In some countries, as a consequence of entering the European Union, visa obli-
gations were introduced for countries whose population previously had enjoyed the right 
of visa-free travel. E.g. Hungary has introduced visa obligations for citizens of Serbia-
Montenegro and the Ukraine. 
– The Police Law has changed the administrative procedures in regard to foreig-
ners in Slovenia. 
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– The administrative system of work permits for foreigners was modified in Tur-
key in order to reduce the number of foreigners working illegally in the country.  
– The Citizenship Law was amended to close loopholes of illegal stay in Turkey. 
The development of border management organisations. In 2003 border management 
organisations have reported significant improvements in efficiency in terms of better in-
ternational co-operation, more and better trained personnel and better equipment. The fol-
lowing are some selected examples of the development of border services in Central 
and Eastern Europe: 
– The Aviation Department of the State Border Service has been re-organised (Re-
ported by Azerbaijan). 
– Building of temporary lodgings, detention, reception, and removal centres for il-
legal foreign migrants (Reported by Azerbaijan and Turkey).  
– The human trafficking problem was put into the focus of public awareness cam-
paigns and of police training curricula (Reported by Croatia). 
– Installing radar surveillance systems, patrolling vessels and helicopters with 
radar systems, night vision devices and other technological development (Reported by 
Cyprus, Hungary and other services). 
– Border co-operation with neighbouring states was improved, joint committees 
were set up, the network of official places of joint border management was extended to 
new border sections (Reported by the Czech Republic, Hungary and Latvia). 
– Information systems on visas, invitations and persons were developed (Repor-
ted by Latvia). 
– Co-operation with qualified interpreters was enhanced (Reported by Latvia). 
– New border patrol stations on the external EU border were built and planned (Re-
ported by Poland).  
– Surveillance of border traffic and of “green border” sections was merged and 
integrated border checkpoints have been created (Reported by Poland). 
– An inter-ministerial task force on border management was created (Reported 
by Turkey). 
– Organisational reform of the Border Guard. Transition from military methods of 
border management to police-based methods (Reported by the Ukraine). 
Methodology  
The data presented in this paper are based on a unique annual survey of border 
services of Central and Eastern European countries (Tass and Futo, 2003; Futo and Jandl, 
2004). Each year, national border management authorities are asked to answer detailed 
questions pertaining to illegal migration, human smuggling and trafficking. At the same 
time, the survey questions have investigated the development of national border control 
institutions and mechanisms as seen through the eyes of the main policy implemen-
ters – border management bodies.  
The territories of the responding countries constitute a continuous belt between the 
main sending and the main receiving countries of illegal migration in Europe. All of the 
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responding countries serve as transit countries of illegal migration, some of them are 
mainly source countries (e.g. Armenia), while others can be regarded as source, transit and 
target countries at the same time (e.g. Turkey).  
– Quantitative parts of the contributions. The surveys seek to cover the many 
features of illegal migration in the region, placing it into the broader context of the con-
temporary migration situation. The main indicators covered by the annual survey are as 
follows: The number of (a) persons legally crossing the border, (b) persons claiming asy-
lum, (c) border violators by age groups, gender and places of apprehension, (d) people 
being smuggled into the country, (e) apprehended “human smugglers”, (f) people being 
trafficked into the country, (g) apprehended “traffickers in humans”, (h) persons rejec-
ted at the border, (i) persons to whom residence was refused. 
– Qualitative parts of the contributions. The planners of border management and 
asylum procedures are excellent observers of the phenomenon of illegal migration. Be-
sides apprehension statistics, the responding border services have sent their qualitative 
reports, observations and judgements regarding the strategies of border management ser-
vices and that of smuggling organisations. In particular, the qualitative questions of the 
questionnaire focused (a) on the legislation and on the institutional development of law en-
forcement institutions combating illegal migration and (b) on the revealed organisational 
set-up and technical facilities of smuggling organisations. 
Although, due to its very nature, the survey cannot purport to answer all possible 
questions relating to illegal migration in Central and Eastern Europe, it is certainly the 
most authoritative source providing an overview and an estimation of the main trends. 
The interpretation of law enforcement statistics and its limits 
Border apprehension statistics are an important indicator of the volume, directions 
and patterns of illegal migration, but their interpretation should be performed carefully, 
for the following reasons. Data collection on illegal migrants faces the problem of iden-
tifying and counting people who have intentionally made themselves unobservable. It is 
assumed that for every one person caught entering the EU illegally two to four others 
pass unhindered – depending on the effectiveness of border control (Salt, 2002). 
On the other hand, border apprehension data usually refer to cases rather than to 
distinct individuals. Thus, if an individual is apprehended more than once while trying 
to cross an international border illegally, he or she will be counted more than once in ap-
prehension statistics.3 Many apprehended illegal migrants will hide important personal 
data on their status to avoid removal. Information that may establish a person’s illegal 
status is frequently dispersed between different government agencies. Legal problems 
may also prohibit the counting of cases. In some countries, for example, irregular entry 
itself is not a criminal offence, therefore criminal statistics may not sufficiently cover 
                                                      
3 However, our data indicate that, at least in the European context, this conceptual problem with using appre-
hension data can be assessed to be a rather marginal one. For example, data provided by the Czech border po-
lice show that the share of repeated apprehensions out of all border apprehensions was only 11.5% in 2003 (af-
ter 12.2% in 2002). 
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the phenomenon. Country-specific variations of legislation and definitions on legality 
and illegality result in a lack of internationally comparable data on illegal immigration 
(Futo and Tass, 2002). 
Year-to-year differences of apprehension numbers in the case of an individual coun-
try must be analysed bearing in mind the following factors: 
– An increase in the number of apprehended migrants is not necessarily the conse-
quence of increasing illegal migration activity: it may just as well reflect an improvement 
of border management practices. For the interpretation of decreasing apprehension num-
bers analogous statements could be formulated, although they currently appear less likely.  
– Illegal migration trends are significantly influenced by migration and visa poli-
cies. A decrease in apprehensions may be caused by a change in visa policy, which ren-
ders formerly illegal border crossings unnecessary.  
The following examples show how the impact of visa measures have been imme-
diately reflected in apprehension statistics: 
– Since 2002 Romanian citizens have enjoyed visa-free entry into the Schengen 
Area, which has substantially reduced border apprehensions of Romanian citizens. 
– Chinese citizens need visas in Serbia since 2001, which has led to a significant 
decrease of Chinese migrants transiting through Serbia-Montenegro. 
Between-country differences in apprehension numbers may reflect differences in 
the volume of migration flows, but may also be the result of still existing differences be-
tween statistical systems. In particular, there is still no agreement on what exactly is to be 
considered illegal migration. In counting border violations, the statistical systems of most 
border services still have problems when it comes to properly dealing with:  
– cases of readmission,  
– border violation cases of their own citizens 
– and with cases of law-abiding travellers having lost their documents.  
Regarding the above issues, the statistical systems of border services still have 
far to go until full harmonisation is achieved.  
Other indicators. Border apprehension statistics are only one of the possible sour-
ces of indicators on illegal migration. Empirical investigations on illegal migration should 
rely not only on enforcement data, but also on many other sources such as: 
– Sociological surveys; 
– Calculations based on entry and exit statistics; 
– Visa statistics, including refused visas; 
– Statistics on asylum applications and grants; 
– Residence and work permits, including statistics on violations thereof; 
– Other administrative files on foreigners. 
Conclusions 
This paper has looked at the dynamics and patterns of irregular migration in Cen-
tral and Eastern Europe, drawing on a unique collection of quantitative and qualitative data 
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on the phenomenon. The data are drawn from an annual survey of the border services 
of 19 Central and Eastern European states, which has been carried out by the Interna-
tional Centre for Migration Policy Development (ICMPD) for the last eight years. The 
results of the surveys, published in an annual Yearbook, provide a unique compilation 
and overview of irregular migration trends in the region.  
Perhaps the most remarkable, and somewhat surprising feature of irregular mi-
gration trends in the region has been that, overall, the dynamics of apprehensions of ille-
gal migrants at the borders has been sharply decreasing in the years 2001–2003. This fol-
lows a decade of steep increases in border apprehensions during the 1990s. There are se-
veral factors that may account for this observed decrease of border apprehensions.  
First, there are some purely statistical factors that play a role. For example, since 
2002, nationals from Romania and Bulgaria have been visa-exempt in the countries of 
the Schengen area, but also in many countries of the region under survey, removing the 
need of these groups of migrants to cross borders illegally.  
Second, there are some geo-political factors that may have led to lower volumes of 
irregular migration flows in the region. For example, during 2002–2003 the conflict in Af-
ghanistan has gradually stabilized and the war in Iraq in 2003 has led to lower volumes of ir-
regular migration flows emanating from that country than in any of the preceding years.  
Third, the observed decreases in border apprehensions may be the indirect result 
of higher border control standards that have been instituted throughout the region over 
the last years, as border management agencies have gone to great lengths to improve their 
efficiency, which may have had a targeted deterrent effect on irregular migration.  
Finally, fourth, a decrease in apprehensions may also result from new, and as yet 
unknown, strategies and tactics on the part of human smugglers, which may have led to the 
effect that a larger share of illegal border crossings has remained undetected. 
In the final analysis, this survey convincingly demonstrates that the struggle for 
better border protection throughout the region is far from over. The actors facilitating ir-
regular migration for their own profit – the human smugglers – have reacted predictably 
to changes in migration laws, visa regulations and stricter enforcement measures and have 
constantly developed new ways and means to carry out their business. As a result, the 
geographical distribution of illegal migration flows has become more complex and the 
“classical” routes of illegal migration have become more blurred. At the same time, bor-
der management authorities have developed new migration and border control strategies 
as well, and have increased their efforts of countering human smuggling activities. It is 
the interdependence of these two processes that will define migration control efforts for 
many years still to come. 
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Peter Futo, Michael Jandl, Lija Karsakova 
ILEGALNE MIGRACIJE I KRIJUMČARENJE LJUDIMA U SREDNJOJ I 
ISTOČNOJ EUROPI 
SAŽETAK 
Analitičke i statističke službe graničnih kontrola u zemljama Srednje i Istočne Europe zapisale 
su i skupile veliko znanje iz demografije i mehanizama ilegalne migracije tijekom posljednjih petnaest 
godina. U radu se pokušava iskoristiti taj izvor sumiranjem rezultata godišnjeg pregleda koji su obavili 
graničari sedamnaest zemalja. Razvijen je set kvantitativnih indikatora ilegalnih migracija koji se prika-
zuje i interpretira na temelju odgovora graničnih službi na niz kvantitativnih i kvalitativnih pitanja. Em-
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pirijski materijal je, s jedne strane, upotrijebljen za procjenu dinamike i uzoraka ilegalne migracije u Sred-
njoj i Istočnoj Europi, a s druge za ispitivanje razvoja strategija upravljanja granicom. Djelovanje prav-
nih i institucionalnih reforma ispituje se u svjetlu vremenskih i prostornih varijacija statistika uhićenja na 
granici. Međuzavisnost tih dvaju procesa promatra se s gledišta nacionalnih graničnih organa upravljanja 
koji su možda najmjerodavniji izvor informacija. Rezultati godišnjeg pregleda koji su sačinili autori po-
kazuju da, kako se čini, progresivni razvoj kontrolnih mehanizama migracije na nacionalnoj i međuna-
rodnoj razini značajno utječe na neregularne migracijske tokove budući da je većina pokazatelja ilegalne 
migracije značajno smanjena na početku ovog stoljeća. Istodobno, geografska distribucija ilegalnih mig-
racijskih tokova u Srednjoj i Istočnoj Europi postala je složenija tijekom godina. 
KLJUČNE RIJEČI: ilegalna migracija, Srednja i Istočna Europa, krijumčarenje ljudima, upravljanje 
granicom, neregularna migracija, uhićenje na granici, kontrola na granici 
Peter Futo, Michael Jandl, Liia Karsakova 
MIGRATION ILLÉGALE ET TRAFIC D’ÊTRES HUMAINS EN EUROPE 
CENTRALE ET ORIENTALE 
RÉSUMÉ 
Les services d’analyse et de statistiques des organes de contrôle aux frontières dans les pays 
d’Europe centrale et orientale ont acquis une très bonne connaissance de la démographie et des mécanis-
mes de migration illégale au cours des quinze dernières années. Cet article puise à cette source pour 
résumer les résultats du suivi sur un an mené par les gardes-frontière de 17 pays. Une grille d’indicateurs 
quantitatifs des migrations illégales a été élaborée. L’auteur la présente et l’interprète en s’appuyant sur 
les réponses données par les services des frontières à une série de questions quantitatives et qualitatives. 
Ce matériau empirique est, d’une part, utilisé pour évaluer la dynamique et les modèles de migration illé-
gale en Europe centrale et orientale, et d’autre part pour envisager le développement de stratégies de 
gestion des frontières. L’impact des réformes juridiques et institutionnelles est examiné à la lumière des 
variations temporelles et spatiales des statistiques sur les arrestations à la frontière. L’interdépendance de 
ces deux processus est révisée du point de vue des organes nationaux de contrôle des frontières, qui sont 
sans doute la source d’informations la plus fiable. Les auteurs font ressortir des résultats du suivi d’un an 
que l’évolution progressive des mécanismes de contrôle de la migration au niveau national et interna-
tional semble influer notablement sur les courants migratoires illégaux, car la plupart des indicateurs de 
migration illégale sont nettement en baisse au début de ce siècle. Parallèlement, la répartition géographi-
que des courants migratoires illégaux en Europe centrale et orientale est devenue plus complexe au cours 
des dernières années. 
MOTS CLÉS : migration illégale, Europe centrale et orientale, trafic d’êtres humains, gestion des fron-
tières, migration irrégulière, arrestation à la frontière, contrôle des frontières 
